fires, the coordinating instructions and the synchronization matrix specify that Team Echo will initiate suppressive fire when the lead team (Alpha) crosses PL 1. Team Echo's sector of fire is between PL 3 and PL 4. After Objective Base is seized, Team Echo moves to and establishes support-by-fire (SBF) position 4 with its fires oriented toward TRP AB0006 (a TRP for both direct and indirect fire).

Delta Company's mission is to suppress the enemy on Objective Base to prevent him from fixing the main effort with direct fire. To control Delta Company's fires (Figure 4), the coordinating instructions and the synchronization matrix specify that Delta Company will initiate suppressive fire when the lead team (Alpha) crosses PL 1. Delta Company's sector of fire is between PL 2 and PL 3. After Team Alpha reports PL2, Delta Company shifts its fires to between TRP D01 and TRP D02 (both of which are direct fire TRPs.) Upon seizure of Objective Base, Delta Company moves along direction of attack (DOA) South to occupy SBF position 3 to block an enemy counterattack. The orientation of the company is toward TRP AB006.

A detailed direct fire control plan enables a unit to employ and mass direct fire on the enemy's formations or positions. In addition, it serves as the foundation for avoiding fratricide.

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Team and Squad Movement

Firepower versus Speed

CAPTAIN MARK E. GREEN

There are numerous techniques for assaulting across an objective. Some units use individual movement techniques (IMTs) in crossing the objective as a fixed part of their standing operating procedures (SOPs), while others always rush across. But any time we tell leaders and soldiers to use the same technique all the time, we rob them of opportunities to exercise initiative and develop their leadership skills. We also violate the intent of mission-type orders. If junior leaders understand why different methods are used, they will learn to assess the current situation and then choose an appropriate technique.

When conducting an assault, a leader must determine how much effective fire he is taking so he can determine the amount of firepower he needs to suppress the enemy fire. Once effective suppression is achieved, the maneuver elements sweep across the objective with the maximum speed the current situation allows.

In some cases, if four men are shooting, five men can maneuver: the firepower provided by the four shooters is all that is required to suppress the enemy fire, and the five-man maneuver element can move in three-to-five-second rushes. This, of course, is the *ideal* way of moving at maximum speed.

It is difficult, however, to control odd-sized units or mismatched elements in a combat situation. Breaking up teams to increase speed may cause more trouble than it is worth. One means of providing control and increasing speed is a set group of maneuver techniques.

The table below shows examples of set techniques and the leader who is responsible for assessing the situation and choosing the best technique.

The progression is from more movers

TECHNIQUE	DECISION MADE BY
Squads Bound	Platoon Leader
Teams Bound	Squad Leader
Teams Move by Buddy Team	Squad or Team Leader
IMT, One Man per Team	Squad or Team Leader
IMT, One Man per Squad	Squad or Team Leader

than shooters to more shooters than movers; again, the leader up front decides after assessing the effectiveness of the enemy's firepower.

Squads and Teams Bound. The leader of the entire assault element may select this technique, in which one team or squad provides the base of fire while the other maneuvers. The firing team must be able to gain and maintain fire superiority—the key decision of the leader.

Team Moves by Buddy Team. As the team leader maneuvers his element, he encounters fire that prevents him from moving all of his force at the same time. He gives the command to move by buddy team—one two-man team suppresses as the other bounds forward. In this case, the fire of half of his element is enough to suppress the enemy.

One Man Moves per Team or Squad: A numbering system for each member of the team allows the team leader to control the one man moving. The following number system might be used:

#1 Man — Team Leader
#2 Man — SAW Gunner
#3 Man — M203 Gunner
#4 Man — Rifleman

The soldiers know that the movement sequence is always 1, 3, 2, 4, or whatever their leader deems best. Once movement is initiated, the #3 man always moves after hearing that the #1 man is set and so on. No continued commands are required, and the team moves with three men shooting and one maneuvering. This works just as well with a squad—one fire team provides a base of fire while one moves a soldier at a time to a predesignated location. From the new location it provides fire for the other team while it comes on line.

Trying to get the best of all worlds—speed, firepower, and control—is difficult, but it is a worthwhile challenge for commanders who want well-trained units. Relying on only one set method or another fails to develop junior leaders and disregards the advantages of having a leader up front to make the decision. The best possible solution is to have a number of techniques that vary speed and firepower. The end result is a team or squad leader who learns to think, apply the basics, and then maneuver his unit to close with and defeat the enemy.

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LRSD
Adapt, Improvise, and Overcome

CAPTAIN JOHN A. SCHATZEL

During Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the 1st Infantry Division's long-range surveillance detachment (LRSD) conducted 14 successful combat surveillance missions. The soldiers' training back at Fort Riley, Kansas—along with their ability to *adapt, improvise, and overcome* in the face of difficulties—led to that success. The success of those missions was a result of the following ideas, policies, and actions:

Modify the MTOE. The modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) for the divisional LRSD authorizes six surveillance teams, each consisting of five 11B infantrymen and one 31C communications specialist. The radio base station consists primarily of 31Cs but also incorporates eight 11Bs.

In our detachment it was obvious that the 31Cs needed to be moved out of the surveillance teams and to be replaced by the 11Bs from the base station. Since communication procedures are an essential part of every LRSD soldier's training, there was virtually no difference in communications abilities between the soldiers in the 11-series and those in the 31-series.

This reorganization produced two great benefits with no drawbacks:

First, the noncommissioned officers were now in a position to train soldiers in the same specialties as themselves. Under the old organization, it was difficult for a surveillance team leader to train his 31Cs for the portion of the skill qualification test that dealt with communications equipment his team did not use. Likewise, it was difficult for an NCO in the communications section to train a subordinate 11B soldier for an expert infantryman's badge (EIB) test.